

## Message Text

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P R 312014Z JAN 75

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6327

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMCONSUL NICE

AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

AMCONSUL BORDEAUX

AMCONSUL LYON

AMCONSUL MARSEILLE

AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 02805

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT FR

SUBJECT: WHITHER THE FRENCH LEFT

REF: PARIS 24467 (OCTOBER 16, 1974)

1. SUMMARY. SINCE THE END OF SEPTEMBER 1974, THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF) HAS ENGAGED IN INCREASINGLY ACRIMONIOUS PUBLIC ATTACKS ON THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PS) AND ITS LEADERS, ALLEGING A LACK OF SOCIALIST ZEAL IN PURSUING THE COMMON PROGRAM OF THE LEFT AND A GENERAL LACK OF DEDICATION TO LEFT-WING UNITY. THE SOCIALISTS HAVE SO FAR RESPONDED WITH MODERATION IN AN OBVIOUS  
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EFFORT TO PLAY DOWN THE CONFLICT. THE GOAL OF THE WELL-

ORCHESTRATED COMMUNIST ATTACK APPEARS TWO-FOLD: (A) TO REASSERT PCF LEADERSHIP OF THE LEFT IN THE FACE OF RAPID PS MEMBERSHIP GROWTH WHICH, THE COMMUNISTS FEEL, HAS BEEN LARGELY AT THE PCF'S EXPENSE; AND (B) TO HEAD OFF AN UNLIKELY BUT POSSIBLE SOCIALIST DRIFT TOWARDS A CENTER-LEFT ALLIANCE WITH THE GISCARDIANS.

2. PS FIRST SECRETARY FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS EXPECTED TO FURTHER CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL OF THE PS AT ITS ANNUAL CONGRESS AT PAU JANUARY 31 - FEBRUARY 2. HE WILL CONTINUE TO LEAD A LOOSE ALLIANCE OF SOCIALIST FACTIONS WHICH ARE PROBABLY ONLY CAPABLE OF REMAINING UNITED IN PRESENT STRENGTH UNDER HIS PERSONAL LEADERSHIP. THE PCF, CURRENTLY DIRECTED BY A COLLEGIUM WHILE SECRETARY GENERAL GEORGES MARCHAIS RECOVERS FROM A HEART ATTACK, IS LIABLE TO BECOME INCREASINGLY SENSITIVE TO HARD LINERS WITHIN THE PARTY'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. ALTHOUGH MOSCOW'S POSITION ON THE PS/PCF QUARREL IS UNCLEAR, THE SOVIETS PRESUMABLY FAVOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE AS A BRAKE ON WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE GISCARD'S LATENT ATLANTICISM. WE EXPECT THE PS AND PCF TO REMAIN IN AN UNEASY, QUARREL-SOME ALLIANCE -- BUT AN ALLIANCE NONETHELESS -- AT LEAST THROUGH THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR 1978.

END SUMMARY.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY (PS)

3. A GROWING POWER: SHORTLY AFTER THE UNITED LEFT'S NEAR-VICTORY IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (MAY 1974), THE PS LAUNCHED A REMARKABLY SUCCESSFUL MEMBERSHIP AND PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. IN SEVEN MONTHS PS MEMBERSHIP JUMPED FROM 90 THOUSAND AT ELECTION TIME TO APPROXIMATELY 150 THOUSAND AS OF LAST DECEMBER 31. RECENT POLLS DEMONSTRATE BOTH THE BREADTH AND THE DEPTH OF THE PS ACHIEVEMENT: IF LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WERE HELD TODAY THE PS WOULD TAKE SOME 34 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, REPRESENTING AN 11 PERCENT GAIN OVER THE PS TOTALS IN THE 1973 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. THE PARTY'S MOST IMPRESSIVE GAINS HAVE COME IN THREE KEY SOCIO-PROFES-

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SIONAL GROUPS WHICH WERE THE SPECIAL TARGETS OF THE PS  
DRIVE: MID-LEVEL MANAGERS AND BUREAUCRATS (UP 12 PER-  
CENT), WORKERS (11 PERCENT) AND FARMERS (19 PERCENT).  
THESE GAINS HAVE LARGELY BEEN WON AT THE EXPENSE  
OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF) AND GAULLISTS  
(UDR).

4. MITTERRAND SEEKS TO PLACATE CERES: OVER THE PAST  
SIX MONTHS PS FIRST SECRETARY FRANCOIS MITTERRAND HAS  
ATTEMPTED TO PLACATE THE PARTY'S LEFT WING BY REINTE-  
GRATING MORE MODERATE ELEMENTS OF THE SMALL AND  
FRAGMENTED FAR LEFT UNIFIED SOCIALIST PARTY (PSU), LED  
BY ECONOMIST MICHEL ROCARD, WITH THE PS, AND BY HAVING  
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THE PS ADOPT THE PRINCIPLE OF WORKER MANAGEMENT (AUTOGESTION) AS A BASIC PARTY TENET (REFTEL). THE SUCCESS OF THESE MEASURES IS NOT CERTAIN: THE PARTY'S LEFT WING (THE CERES - CENTRE D'ETUDES ET DE RECHERCHES SOCIALISTES) HAS SHOWN IMPRESSIVE STRENGTH IN THE FEDERATION CONGRESSES WHICH PREPARED THE PS ANNUAL CONGRESS AT PAU, WINNING SOME 25 PERCENT OF THE MANDATES (AS OPPOSED TO 18-20 PERCENT A YEAR AGO).

MITTERRAND HAD HOPED TO GO TO PAU AS THE UNCHALLENGED LEADER OF A DYNAMIC AND RESPONSIVE PARTY, HE WILL HAVE TO ADJUST TO A CONGRESS WHICH WILL GIVE CERES SUFFICIENT SUPPORT TO JUSTIFY UP TO FIVE CERES NATIONAL SECRETARISHIPS (CERES NOW HOLDS THREE OF THE 12 SEATS IN THE SECRETARIAT; TWO MORE MIGHT REPRESENT ENOUGH STRENGTH TO FORCE A CERES-LED REORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUNCTION IN THE PARTY).

5. THE DELICATE INTERNAL BALANCE: AVAILABLE EVIDENCE ON THE EVE OF THE PAU CONGRESS SUGGESTS THAT IF MITTERRAND WAS COUNTING ON THE NEW MEMBERS OF THE PS TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A STRONGER MAJORITY THAN HE HAS HITHERTO HELD, HE HAS BEEN PROVEN WRONG. CERES HAS REGISTERED ITS GREATEST GAINS IN THOSE FEDERATIONS WITH THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGES OF NEW MEMBERS. MITTERRAND HAD ORIGINALLY HOPED TO DECENTRALIZE THE PARTY'S DECREPIT INSTITUTIONS, THUS ELIMINATING SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH RUNNING A PS WHOSE TOP LEADERSHIP (THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT) IS FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN FACTIONAL DISPUTES. IN VIEW OF THE CERES RECRUDESCENCE, HE MAY NOW BE TEMPTED TO STAY WITH THE PRESENT SYSTEM WHICH AT LEAST HAS THE MERIT OF FORCING DISSIDENTS TO OPERATE IN THE CENTRALIZED ENVIRONMENT OF WHICH MITTERRAND IS A MASTER. FOR THE TIME BEING, NO MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN THE PARTY'S DIRECTION SEEMS IMMINENT BARRING A COMPLETE UPHEAVAL AT PAU.

6. THE PCF JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED LEFT: PCF READINGS OF THE LESSONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN HAVE BEEN DIRECTED BY THE IDEOLOGICAL NECESSITY OF REMAINING THE MAJOR PARTY OF THE LEFT. THE FIRST PCF CONCLUSIONS CAME

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ON THE HEELS OF THE PS MEMBERSHIP DRIVE; AS A PARTY WHICH MUST RECRUIT SEVEN NEW MEMBERS TO HOLD TWO, THE PCF WAS ALARMED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PS APPEARED TO BE WINNING ITS NEW MEMBERS THROUGH INCURSIONS IN TERRITORIES THE PCF HAD PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED ITS OWN. THE PCF RESPONDED WITH A RELATIVELY UNSUCCESSFUL MEMBERSHIP DRIVE OF ITS OWN. A SECOND PCF SHOCK CAME

AFTER THE SEPTEMBER, 1974 PARTIAL LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN WHICH PCF CANDIDATES CONSISTENTLY RAN BEHIND OTHER UNITED LEFT CANDIDATES; IT WAS NATURAL THAT THE PCF SHOULD BLAME ITS PS PARTNERS, WITH L'HUMANITE, THE PCF DAILY, ACIDLY NOTING THAT THE PS HAD FAILED TO ASSIST PCF CANDIDATES TO CAPITALIZE ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION MOMENTUM WHICH THE PCF HAD HELPED TO GENERATE. BUT THE BITTEREST LESSON WAS DRAWN FROM THE OCTOBER PS ASSIZES, WHEN THE PS ACTIVELY WOODED AND WON IMPORTANT SEGMENTS, MOST NOTABLY IN THE CFTD (CONFEDERATION FRANCAISE DEMOCRATIQUE DU TRAVAIL), OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REGARDED AS UNPOLITICIZED (REFTEL). UP UNTIL THE SOCIALIST ASSIZES, THE PCF HAD REGARDED THE IDEA OF WORKER MANAGEMENT AS SOMETHING OF A ROMANTIC DIVERSION FROM THE VITALLY IMPORTANT TASK OF POLITICAL ORGANIZING AMONG WORKERS; PS ADOPTION OF "AUTOGESTION" THUS APPEARED TO MANY SENIOR PCF CADRES AS A WEAKENING OF PS COMMITMENT TO THE LETTER OF THE COMMON PROGRAM.

7. A QUESTION OF TACTICS: SINCE SEPTEMBER THE PCF HAS CONDUCTED A CAREFULLY-ORCHESTRATED ATTACK ON THE PS, REACHING DEEPLY INTO THE LEXICON OF INTRA-LEFT INVECTIVE TO PORTRAY THE SOCIALISTS AS LESS DEDICATED

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 PARIS 02805

THAN THE PCF TO THE LEFT'S COMMON PROGRAM AND TO THE  
DEFENSE OF THE WORKERS HARD HIT, THE PCF CLAIMS, BY  
THE GOF'S "AUSTERITY" MEASURES. THE PCF HINTS THAT THE  
SOCIALISTS MAY BE READY TO SHARE IN THE RESPONSIBILITY  
OF "MANAGING THE CRISIS" WITH THE GOF.

8. THE PCF CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN SHARPPPLY FOCUSED,  
UNSPARING AND WELL-MANAGED, AS REFLECTED IN PERSONNEL  
SHIFTS WITHIN THE PARTY. ELDER STATESMAN ETIENNE  
FAJON, PCF SECRETARY GENERAL GEORGES MARCHAIS' LONG-  
TIME ALLY, HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH HARDLINER ROLAND  
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LEROY AS DIRECTOR OF THE PARTY NEWSPAPER L'HUMANITE.  
PARISIAN DEPUTY PAUL LAURENT, AN ARCHITECT OF LEFT  
UNITY, HAS BEEN ENLISTED IN WRITING VITUPERATIVE FRONT-  
PAGE EDITORIALS FOR THE PAPER. FOR WEEKS BEFORE HIS  
RECENT HEART ATTACK, THE PARISIAN RUMOR MILL HAD IT  
THAT MARCHAIS, WHOSE CONTINUED LEADERSHIP OF THE PCF  
WAS STAKED ON THE UNION OF THE LEFT, WAS AT LOGGERHEADS  
WITH THE PARTY'S "PURS ET DURS", THE STALINIST/  
THOREZIAN FUNDAMENTALIST CURRENT; IT IS LIKELY THAT  
THE RULING COLLEGIUM TENDS MORE TO THE LATTER POSITION  
THAN TO MARCHAIS'. WHILE THE PCF CAMPAIGN WAS AT  
FIRST SUCCESSFUL ONLY IN FURTHER AROUSING AN ALREADY-  
SUSPICIOUS RANK-AND-FILE AGAINST THE PS, IN RECENT  
WEEKS POLLS AND COMMENTATORS ALIKE HAVE NOTED A GROW-  
ING PUBLIC CYNICISM WHICH TAKES THE QUARREL AS A SIGN  
OF A RETURN TO THE INTERNECINE WARFARE WHICH CHARAC-  
TERIZED THE FRENCH LEFT UNDER DE GAULLE AND DURING  
THE FOURTH REPUBLIC.

THE PCF-PS QUARREL

9. THE PROBLEM OF POWER. THE PCF CLAIMS TO FEAR THAT THE PS WILL ENTER A GISCARD GOVERNMENT AT A TIME WHEN THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE SWEEPING CHANGES OF THE COMMON PROGRAM DO NOT EXIST. BOTH MAJOR PARTIES OF THE UNITED LEFT HAVE SAID THAT THEY WOULD ENTER INTO A GOVERNMENT ONLY IN THE EVENT OF

-- A UNITED LEFT LEGISLATIVE ELECTION VICTORY  
LARGE ENOUGH (I.E., MORE THAN A "SQUEAK-  
THROUGH") TO BE CONSIDERED A CLEAR MANDATE  
FROM THE FRENCH PEOPLE TO IMPLEMENT THE  
COMMON PROGRAM, COMBINED WITH

-- THE PRESIDENT'S NAMING OF THE HEAD OF THE  
UNITED LEFT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT.

SINCE THE PRESIDENT IS NOT OBLIGED TO APPOINT THE HEAD OF THE PARTY WHICH WINS THE MOST VOTES IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS AS HIS PRIME MINISTER, BOTH PARTIES FEAR THAT AN IMPASSE COULD RESULT IF ONLY ONE OF THE CONDITIONS  
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ABOVE WERE MET -- BUT THE PCF FEARS IT MORE.

10. EQUALLY VEXING TO THE PCF ARE THE PS' MUNICIPAL ALLIANCES WITH PARTIES AND PERSONS WHO HAVE NOT SIGNED THE COMMON PROGRAM. IN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT CITIES (LYON, MARSEILLE, MONTBELIARD) THE PS CAN ONLY GOVERN IN COALITION WITH CENTER DEMOCRATS AND OTHERS WHOSE REFORMIST, AMELIORIST POLITICS ARE ANATHEMA TO THE PCF. THUS, WHILE ATTACKING THE PS FOR ITS REFUSAL TO STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT IT WILL NOT ENTER INTO POWER AND WILL NOT ABANDON ITS POLICY OF ALLIANCES WITH THE REFORMIST CENTER, THE PCF HAS PROPOSED A SERIES OF DEBATES WITH THE PS IN THE MAJOR CITIES OF FRANCE TO "EXPLAIN OUR JOINT COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON PROGRAM". PS OFFICIALS SEE IN SUCH DEBATES ONLY AN ATTEMPT TO EMBARRASS THE SOCIALISTS FURTHER AND HAVE GUARDED THEIR SILENCE, THUS LEAVING THE PCF TO APPEAR AS AGGRESSIVE AND ILL-TEMPERED.

11. ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL, WHILE NEITHER PARTY INTENDS TO ENTER INTO GOVERNMENT ONLY TO APPLY DEFLATIONARY MEASURES WHICH COULD REQUIRE BELT TIGHTENING ON THE PART OF FRANCE'S WORKING POPULATION, THE PS IS WILLING TO ADMIT THAT THE FRENCH PEOPLE ARE NOT YET READY FOR THE SOCIALISM OF THE COMMON PROGRAM. IT IS THIS PS FAILURE TO HEW TO THE LETTER OF THE PROGRAM'S IDEOLOGICAL TENETS WHICH, IN COMBINATION WITH THE INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS, HAS BROUGHT PCF ATTACKS ON THE PS TO THEIR CURRENT HEAT.

12. SILENCE FROM THE PS: IN THE FACE OF PCF ATTACKS,  
PS PUBLIC REACTION HAS BEEN MILD; THE PARTY HAS

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REFUSED TO ENTER INTO A POINT-BY-POINT POLEMIC WITH  
THE PCF. PS LEADERS HAVE REPEATEDLY REAFFIRMED THE  
PARTY'S COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON PROGRAM AND HAVE  
CONTINUED TO SAY THAT THEY REGRET THE QUARREL.  
PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, THE PS IS SPLIT INTO TWO  
CAMPS: MITTERRAND AND HIS FOLLOWERS CONTINUE TO ARGUE



THAT RESPONDING TO THE PCF WOULD MERELY CONFIRM TO THE  
GENERAL PUBLIC THAT THE LEFT IS INCAPABLE OF A UNITED  
FRONT, AND CONFIRM THE GRAVITY OF PCF ACCUSATIONS.  
ON THE OTHER HAND, CERES AND THE PARTY'S LEFT INSIST  
THAT IT IS ONLY BY ENTERING INTO A "PROGRAMMATIC  
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DEBATE" THAT THE PS CAN DEMONSTRATE ITS VIGILANCE  
AGAINST A KIND OF CREEPING "SOCIAL DEMOCRATISM." WHILE  
THE ARGUMENT AT THE HEART OF THE PS IS HEATED, IF A  
MOTION TO COMMIT THE PARTY TO A DEBATE WITH THE PCF  
WERE TO REACH THE FLOOR OF THE PAU CONGRESS, MOST  
OBSERVERS FEEL THAT IT WOULD ONLY GET 35 - 40 PERCENT  
OF THE MANDATES.

13. FOR THE PS, ALREADY PREPARING FOR THE 1977 MUNI-  
CIPAL ELECTIONS, THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT TACTICAL  
IMPERATIVE IS TO TIGHTEN ITS CONTROL OVER THOSE CITIES  
WHERE IT IS IN OR NEARLY IN THE MAJORITY WHILE SIMUL-  
TANEOUSLY KEEPING OPEN ITS POSSIBILITIES OF ALLIANCE  
WITH "SYMPATHIZERS" OF THE COMMON PROGRAM. THIS  
CONSIDERATION WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE AT PAU AS  
THE CERES WING TRIES TO FORCE THE PS TO COMMIT ITSELF  
TO MUNICIPAL ELECTORAL ALLIANCES ONLY WITH "SIGNATORIES"  
OF THE COMMON PROGRAM.

14. THE PATHOLOGY OF THE PROBLEM: HAVING NEVER HAD  
CONTROL OF, ALTHOUGH IT HAS PARTICIPATED IN, A FRENCH  
GOVERNMENT, THE PCF HAS DEVELOPED AN UNREALISTIC VIEW  
OF GOVERNMENT PROCESS AND NOW APPEARS COMMITTED TO ENTE-  
RING A GOVERNMENT ONLY WHEN IT CAN DO SO FREE OF THE  
NEED FOR COMPROMISE WHICH IT ASSOCIATES WITH BOURGEOIS  
SOCIETY. IN EFFECT, THIS FORCES A POLICY OF ALL-OR-  
NOTHING ON THE UNITED LEFT. THE PS, WITH FAR GREATER  
EXPERIENCE IN POWER IN THE THIRD AND FOURTH REPUBLICS,  
IS MORE SANGUINE ABOUT THE EFFICACY OF BOTH THE  
GOVERNMENT PROCESS AND THE NATURE OF POLITICAL COMPROMISE  
THAN ITS PCF ALLIES, AND IS THUS IN THE UNCOMFORTABLE  
SITUATION OF HAVING TO DEAL SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE  
PCF'S LEGITIMATE TACTICAL FEARS AND THEIR PATHOLOGICAL  
ROOTS.

#### SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

15. UNITED LEFT VIABILITY? IN SPITE OF THE STINGING  
PCF ATTACK, THE PS HAS NOT YET BEGUN TO THINK SERIOUSLY  
ABOUT TAKING THE INITIATIVE IN BREAKING UP THE UNITED  
LEFT. IF THE PCF CONTINUES ITS ATTACKS AFTER PAU, IF  
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THE PS LEFT WING SHOULD BY ANY CHANCE CONVINCE THE PARTY TO GO INTO A SERIES OF DEBATES WITH THE PCF OR SHOULD MITTERRAND'S CONTROL OVER HIS PARTY WAVER, A BITTER INTER-PARTY POLEMIC COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT PROSPECTS FOR THE UNITED LEFT.

16. FROM THE COMMUNIST VIEWPOINT, PRIMARY CONSIDERATIONS WILL SURELY BE PCF ESTIMATES OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PCF FEELS IT WILL NEED SOCIALIST GOOD WILL FOR COMMON INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL ACTIONS IN 1975, AND PCF ESTIMATES OF COMMUNIST POSSIBILITIES IN THE 1977 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. WITH OVER 25,000 LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS, THE PCF MUST SAFEGUARD ITS LOCAL STRENGTH TO REMAIN CREDIBLE. ON BALANCE WE EXPECT THE PS AND PCF TO REMAIN IN AN UNEASY, QUARRELSOME ALLIANCE -- BUT AN ALLIANCE NEVERTHELESS -- AT LEAST THROUGH THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR 1978.

17. CHANGING VOTER PREFERENCES: IF THE PS TODAY IS FASTER-GROWING THAN THE PCF AND HAS A GREATER POTENTIAL IN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS (FROM ITS CURRENT 91 SEATS TO A POSSIBLE 150 SEATS VS. THE PCF'S CURRENT 74 SEATS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME SLIGHT PCF LOSSES), IT IS PERHAPS BECAUSE MITTERRAND HAS CORRECTLY ANALYZED THE LESSONS THE LEFT SHOULD DRAW FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. ARGUING THAT THE FRENCH PEOPLE ARE NOT READY TO ACCEPT SOCIALISM, MITTERRAND HAS SUCCESSFULLY MANAGED TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS PARTY IS READY TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR A PROGRAM WHICH FALLS SHORT OF THE COMMON PROGRAM -- ALTHOUGH HE HAS NEVER FURNISHED THE PCF WITH FURTHER AMMUNITION BY SAYING SO PUBLICLY. MITTERRAND HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO

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CAST HIS CRITIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN MORE CONSTRUCTIVE  
TERMS THAN IN THE PAST, USUALLY ACCOMPANYING HIS  
OBSERVATIONS WITH REASONED SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE.  
THIS TOO HAS HAD ITS EFFECT ON THE PS IMAGE.

18. IN FRANCE AS ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE: THE CURRENT  
PCF/PS QUARREL FITS INTO THE LENGTHY TRADITION OF  
COMMUNIST/SOCIALIST RIVALRY OVER DOMINANCE OF THE LEFT.  
IN FRANCE AS IN WESTERN EUROPE IN GENERAL, THE COLD  
WAR EXACERBATED CONFLICTS BORN AT THE TURN OF THE  
CENTURY. THE STALINIST INFLUENCE HAS BEEN STRONGEST  
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ON THOSE COMMUNIST PARTIES -- LIKE THE PORTUGUESE --  
WHICH HAVE GONE THROUGH THE LONGEST PERIOD OF ABSENCE  
FROM ANY KIND OF LEGITIMACY. IN FRANCE, WHERE THE  
PCF HAS HAD MINISTERS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND  
WHERE STALINISM NEVER ACHIEVED, AMONG PCF'S "POLITICAL  
TYPES", THE SORT OF CULT STATUS WHICH IT HAD IN CLAN-  
DESTINE PARTIES, COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY HAS OFTEN BEEN  
CONSIDERABLY BENT TO REFLECT NATIONALISTIC ASPIRATIONS.  
WHAT IS NEW IN THE CURRENT QUARREL IS THAT SOCIALISTS  
AND COMMUNISTS ALIKE ARE VICTIMS OF AN ECONOMIC AND

ENERGY CRISIS FOR WHICH THE SOLUTIONS LIE OUTSIDE  
NATIONAL BORDERS.

19. THE MOSCOW CONNECTION: THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PCF  
IS INFLUENCED BY MOSCOW IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ASSESS.  
ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES WHICH DO NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVE  
FRENCH NATIONAL INTERESTS, IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE PCF  
FOLLOWS WITHOUT DEVIATION THE CURRENT MOSCOW LINE.  
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION CAN DICTATE PCF  
POLICY ON CSCE, MBFR, SALT OR THE EC IS LESS CLEAR.  
WHILE THE PCF IS CERTAINLY INFLUENCED BY MOSCOW  
PRESSURES, IT TENDS TO REACT TO GOF FOREIGN POLICY  
INITIATIVES IN PERHAPS A MORE NATIONALISTIC WAY THAN  
MOSCOW WOULD PREFER. ONE DIRECT MEANS OF INFLUENCE  
WHICH MOSCOW IS ALLEGED TO HAVE OVER THE PCF IS MONEY;  
PARIS RUMOR HAS IT THAT SOME 30 PERCENT OF THE PCF  
OPERATING BUDGET COMES FROM FOREIGN SOURCES.

20. MOSCOW'S POSITION ON THE CURRENT PS/PCF QUARREL IS  
ALSO UNCLEAR. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY PREFERRED GISCARD AND  
A CONTINUATION OF FRANCE'S GRUDGING ACCEPTANCE OF  
DETENTE TO THE POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING FOREIGN POLICY  
PROPOSED BY MITTERRAND (WHICH WAS IN FACT LESS DIFFERENT  
FROM GISCARD'S THAN THE PRESS CAMPAIGN COVERAGE INDICA-  
TED). WITH THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS NOT  
SCHEDULED UNTIL 1981, THE SOVIETS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE  
FAVORABLE TOWARD THE CONTINUATION OF A STRONG UNITED  
LEFT AS A BRAKE ON WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE GISCARD'S  
LATENT ATLANTICISM.  
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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PARTY UNITY, PARTY DISSENSION, POLITICAL PARTIES, COMMUNISTS, PARTY MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
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**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975PARIS02805  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750037-0144  
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**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Reference:** 75 PARIS 24467, 75 (OCTOBER 16, 75 197  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 MAY 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <19 MAY 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <20 MAY 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

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**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** WHITHER THE FRENCH LEFT  
**TAGS:** PINT, FR, FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY, SOCIALIST PARTY  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006